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Abstract 
Bourassa and Hendershott use data from the 1986 Income Distribution Survey 
in Australia to argue a case for the taxation of imputed rent on owner occupied 
housing. They conclude that both on equity grounds and in terms of 
traditional economic efficiency, taxation of imputed rental income together 
with deductibility of mortgage interest would be better than the current 
situation which does not tax imputed rental income and penalises debt. 
Previous claims that a tax on imputed rent would be regressive are shown to be 
due to failure to control for life cycle effects and, more importantly 
mismeasurement of income. 
v 
On the Distributional Effects of Taxing Imputed Rent 
Steven C. Bourassa and Patrie H. Hendershott* 
Introduction 
In both Australia and the United States, owner-occupied housing has long 
been supported by government policy and roughly two-thirds of households 
have attained that tenure.l While the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated 
the deductibility of interest paid on other forms of consumer credit, the home 
mortgage interest deduction was at least partially retained and the tax-free 
status of imputed rental income was continued.2 Although mortgage interest is 
not deductible in Australia, owner-occupied housing is favoured because 
imputed rental income is not taxed.3 Capital gains tax provisions in both 
•Steven C. Bourassa is Research Fellow in the Urban Research Program at the Australian 
National University. Patrie H. Hendershott holds the John W. Galbreath Chair in Real Estate 
and is Professor of Finance and Public Policy at the Ohio State University. This paper was 
written while Professor Hendershott was a Visiting Fellow in the Urban Research Program. 
The authors are grateful to Barry Reece, Judy Yates, and Gavin Wood for their constructive 
comments on earlier drafts, and to Don Brunker for his assistance. 
1 Home ownership rates in the two countries arc currently about 70 and 64 per cent, 
respectively. The Australian rate is from the 1990 Survey of Income and Housing Costs and 
Amenities; the U.S. figure is from the 1988 Annual Housing Survey. 
2Follain and Ling show that the combination of the increase in the standard deduction and 
decreases in allowable non-housing related deductions effectively made much of mongagc 
interest non-deductible for many households. J. Follain and D. Ling, 'Federal Tax Subsidies 
to Housing and the Reduced Value of the Mortgage Interest Deduction,' National Tax Journal 
44 (1991): 147-168. 
31t should be recalled that Australia taxed net imputed rental income at the national level 
between 1915, when the Commonwealth income tax was introduced, and 1923. For funher 
details, sec: B.F. Reece, 'Taxing Imputed Rents: Australian Precedents,' Community 2 (1975): 
2 
countries also favour owner-occupied housing. In the U.S., capital gains are 
not taxed if the proceeds are applied to the purchase of another house of equal 
or greater value, and a one-time write off of up to $125,000 in gains is also 
permitted. Australia introduced taxation of real capital gains in 1985, but 
exempted gains on the owner occupier's principal residence. 
Although governments in both countries seem unlikely to tackle the tax-
favoured status of owner-occupied housing, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the issue so that policy analysts can at least make appropriate 
economic recommendations. The National Housing Strategy (NHS) in 
Australia advanced understanding by commissioning two studies dealing with 
this issue, both of which were published as background papers in 1992. One 
of the NHS papers, by Bourassa and Hendershott, compared user costs for 
owner-occupied housing and other capital assets to determine the extent to 
which the tax system favours the former.4 The second paper, by Apps, 
focused on the distributional effects of a hypothetical tax on net imputed rent.5 
Unfortunately, the two studies seemed to reach opposite conclusions. 
Bourassa and Hendershott concluded that the failure to tax owner-occupiers' 
imputed rent resulted in significant incentives to over-invest in housing in 
Australia. The natural implication is that a tax on imputed rent would increase 
6-7, and 'Simons' Account of Australian Taxation of Imputed Rental Income,' Australian Tax 
Forum 2 (1985): 239-242. At least eight OECD countries currently tax net imputed rents; these 
are listed in R. Robinson, Urban Housing Finance (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 1988), p. 41, table 13. 
4s.C. Bourassa and P.H. Hendershott, Over-Investment in Australian Housing? National 
Housing Strategy Background Paper no. 9 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1992). 
5p. Apps, The Role of Home Ownership, National Housing Strategy Background Paper no. 
10 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992). 
social welfare.6 Apps, however, argued that a tax on net imputed rent would 
be highly regressive and therefore undesirable on equity grounds. More 
specifically, she computed that the percentage increase in taxes would be six 
times as large for the lowest income decile as for the top half of the income 
distribution (see her table 1.2, p. 17). This finding is somewhat startling. 
When taxation of imputed rents was introduced in the United Kingdom and 
Australia, improving equity, not efficiency, was the rationale.7 Moreover, 
numerous academics have recently advanced the imputed rent tax on equity 
grounds.8 
3 
In this paper, we show that Apps' results are due to a combination of not 
controlling for life cycle effects and mismeasuring income. On th~ former, 
the combination of a tax on imputed rent and mortgage interest deductibility 
would clearly favour those with high debt relative to those with low debt, i.e., 
the young relative to the old. However, over the full life cycle, this 
differential effect cancels out. On the latter, income should include imputed 
rental income on housing, as well as reported non-housing income. Those 
with large houses and modest non-housing income are not "poor" relative to 
those with small houses and somewhat larger non-housing income. With 
6s.c. Bourassa and P.H. Hendershott, Over-Investment in Australian Housing: Implications 
for Tax Policy, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper no. 272 (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1992). 
7we thank Barry Reece for this observation. 
Bsee, for example, J. Flood and J. Yates, Housing Subsidies Study, Australian Housing 
Research Council Project Series no. 160 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1987), G.A. Wood, Taxation and Housing, National Housing Strategy Background 
Paper no. 5 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991), and J. Yates, 
Australia's Owner-Occupied Housing Wealth and Its Impact on Income Distribution, Social 
Policy Research Centre Reports and Proceedings no. 92 (Kensington: University of New 
South Wales, 1991). 
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income properly measured and life-cycle effects held constant, a tax on 
imputed rental income is progressive. 
This paper is divided into three sections. We first summarise the case for 
efficiency gains stemming from the taxation of imputed rents, then tum to the 
direct distributional effects, and conclude with some observations about 
general equilibrium and transitional issues. 
The Case For Imputed Rent Taxation 
The user cost of capital takes into account all of the relevant costs and 
benefits-including the real after-tax financing rate, the economic depreciation 
rate, tax rates, expected inflation rates, subsidies, and tax credits and tax 
depreciation-associated with 'using' a unit of capital for one year. Neo-
classical investment theory tells us that, in the absence of externalities, risk-
adjusted net (of depreciation) user costs should be the same across capital assets 
so that marginal investments are equally productive. While home ownership 
may well provide externalities, it is unlikely that externalities result from 
investment in larger houses by middle or upper income households; i.e., 
encouraging middle and upper income households, who will be home owners 
in any event, to invest in additional owner-occupied housing is not sound 
policy. Iii fact, recent research by de Long suggests that large externalities are 
generated by business investment in equipment (machinery).9 Because 
technological innovations are introduced into the economy through equipment 
investment, encouraging this investment substantially increases labour 
productivity and thus economic well-being. This suggests that risk-adjusted 
net user costs should be lower for business investments on average (for 
equipment in particular) than for housing. 
9J.B. De Long and L.H. Summers, 'Equipment Investment and Economic Growth,' Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106 (1991): 445-502. 
5 
Bourassa and Hendershott show that the typical user cost for business 
investments, including rental housing, was substantially higher than that for 
owner-occupied housing in both 1984-85 and 1990-91 in both Australia and 
the U.S.10 Calculations based on more recent data lead to similar conclusions. 
Australian business user costs for 1991-92 are reported in table 1. Business 
user costs vary largely due to differences in the relationship between tax 
depreciation and economic depreciation across assets. For example, on 
average equipment can be depreciated for tax purposes at about four times its 
economic depreciation rate. In contrast, residential buildings are depreciated 
for tax purposes at 1.5 times economic depreciation) 1 As noted above, this 
may be good tax policy owing to positive externalities of equipment. 
investment. 
User costs for owner-occupied housing are shown in table 2. Owner-
occupier costs decrease with increases in the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, 
because higher rates reduce the opportunity cost of alternative investments of 
owner equity, but increase with increases in the debt ratio because purchasers 
cannot deduct interest from income for tax purposes. Given the debt tax 
penalty, Australian purchasers attempt to reduce mortgage debt as quickly as 
possible. It is not surprising that the average housing debt ratio across all 
home owners and purchasers is only about 0.15 in Australia compared with 
0.44 in the U.S., where mortgage interest is, in most cases, deductible.12 We 
lOs.c. Bourassa and P.H. Hendershott, 'Changes in the Relative Incentives to Invest in 
Housing: Australia, Sweden, and the United States,' Journal of Housing Economics 2 (1992): 
60-83. 
11 These comparisons are based on mean asset lives for privately-owned assets as reported in 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: Concepts, Sources and Methods, 
cat. no. 5216.0 (Canberra: ABS, 1990). 
12Tue Australian ratio was estimated from the 1986 Income Distribution Survey (see table 5); 
the U.S. ratio is from the Federal Reserve Bank's Flow of Funds Accounts. 
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emphasise that debt and equity are treated symmetrically in the U.S., but not in 
Australia.13 
Table 1 Net user costs for business investments, 1991-92a 
Capital asset Net user cost 
Corporate investments 
Equipment 
Industrial manufacturing 
buildings and shon-term 
traveller accommodations 
Other buildings 
Non-corporate investments 
Commercial buildings 
Residential buildings b 
Mean 
otes: 
0.0750 
0.0868 
0.0931 
0.0894 
0.0917 
0.0872 
a. Assumes 3% expected inflation and 9% nominal debt rates. 
b. Because the vast majority of rental housing is owned by non-corporate entities, we do not 
repon user costs for corporate investments in rental housing. 
Table 2 Net user costs for owner-occupied housing, 1991-92a 
Net user cost 
Marginal l.2i1!J-lQ:Vl1)!.!I: TllllQ 
tax rateb 0.5 0 
0 0.0934 0.0934 0.0934 
0.2125 0.0934 0.0841 0.0748 
0.3925C 0 .0934 0 .0762 0 .0591 
0.4725 0.0934 0.0727 0.0521 
0.4825 0.0934 0.0723 0.0512 
otes: 
a. Assumes 3% expected inflation and 9% nominal debt rates. 
b. Includes Medicare levies. 
c. Rate applicable to taxpayers with average incomes. 
13Bourassa and Hendershott, 'Changes in the Relative Incentives to Invest in Housing.' 
The user costs reported in tables 1 and 2 indicate substantial incentives to 
misallocate capital both between the owner-occupied and business sectors and 
within the owner-occupied sector. The average net user cost for business 
investments is about 8.7 per cent, while that for owner-occupied housing is 
only about 6.4 per cent (assuming a 0.15 average debt ratio).14 The wide 
variation in user costs across owner-occupiers implies that individuals in low 
tax brackets and with low wealth (high debt) will tend to occupy smaller 
houses relative to their expected lifetime resources than will high tax bracket 
and wealth individuals. Moreover, households who expect to earn constant 
risk-adjusted incomes over their lifetimes, will tend to own smaller houses in 
their early (low wealth) years than in their middle (high wealth) years. 
7 
The user costs also imply substantial inequities. Lower income/wealth 
households pay a higher after-tax price for each unit of owner-occupied 
housing than do higher income/wealth households. Moreover, renters pay a 
higher price, on average over their life cycles, than do owners, and renters, on 
average, have far lower incomes than owners.15 On both equity and efficiency 
grounds, it would seem that a tax on owner-occupiers' net imputed rent would 
be desirable. 
Policy changes that would narrow the difference in user costs across 
individuals would increase the efficiency of the allocation of the owner-
14some tax-favoured investments are not included in the tables. Specifically, business 
investment in goodwill (advertising) is generally not taxed, nor is household investment in 
consumer durables. On the efficiency gains from taxing goodwill investment more heavily, see 
D. Fullerton and A.B. Lyon, 'Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital,' in L.H. Summers, ed., 
Tax Policy and the Economy 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research/MIT Press, 1988). Taxing imputed rent would include taxing those durables 
(appliances, built-ins) incorporated in the house value. 
15Yates emphasizes the importance of these horizontal inequities; see, for example, J. Yates, 
Australia's Owner-Occupied Housing Wealth and Its Impact on Income Distribution. 
8 
occupied stock. Variation across loan-to-value ratios would be eliminated by 
introduction of deductibility of home mortgage interest. User costs would 
then be independent of the loan-to-value ratio and would equal those in the last 
column of table 2 (under loan-to-value ratio= 0).16 Unfortunately, this 
action would reduce user costs for most individuals while raising user costs for 
none. Not only would a net loss of tax revenue occur, but the average user 
cost for owner-occupied housing would be about 5.9 per cent as compared to 
the 8.7 per cent user cost for business capital. That is, efficiency gains from a 
better allocation within the owner-occupied housing stock would come at the 
expense of efficiency losses from over-investment in housing. 
The over-investment-in-housing problem can be addressed by 
simultaneously imposing a tax on estimated imputed rental income.17 In fact, 
this tax, along with mortgage interest deductibility, could remove all variation 
in owner user costs if the estimated rental income were set at i/(1 + 7t) or 
0.087 in the present case (i is the 0.09 nominal debt rate and 7t is the 0.03 
I6with deductibility of mongage interest, the real after-tax financing rate for the kth owner-
occupier, rk, is: 
r k = [(I - tk)i + a - 7t]/(l + 7t}, 
where tk is the household's average marginal tax rate, i is the interest rate, a is the risk 
premium, and 7t is the expected inflation rate. This equation may be compared with equation 
(6] in Bourassa and Hendershott (1992), Appendix A. Note that r no longer depends on the 
debt ratio. 
l 7With an imputed rent tax and no subsidy, the net user cost for owner-occupied housing 
becomes: 
p - d = rk + tkx + w, 
where p is the gross marginal product of capital, d is the economic depreciation rate, x is the 
fraction of house value taxed, w is the propeny tax rate, and the other variables are as defined 
in footnote 9. This equation may be compared with equation [I'] in Bourassa and Hendershott 
(1992), Appendix A. 
9 
expected inflation rate).18 If taxes were assessed on this fraction of house 
value and home mortgage interest were deductible, then the user cost would be 
9.34 per cent for all individuals.19 That is, the user cost would be increased 
for most individuals and lowered for none. Here, the efficiency gains from a 
better allocation within the owner-occupied housing stock would come at the 
expense of efficiency losses from under-investment in owner-occupied 
housing. 
A compromise can be struck to improve both the efficiency of capital 
allocation within the owner-occupied housing stock and between this housing 
and other capital: taxation of a lower estimate of imputed rental income along 
with the home mortgage interest deduction. Table 3 gives real user costs for 
estimates of imputed rental income ranging from 3 to 6 per cent of house 
value. With the 4.5 per cent estimate, individuals with a current debt ratio of 
about 50 per cent would be largely unaffected by the change, gaining as much 
from the deductibility of interest as they lose from the tax on imputed rental 
income (compare these user costs with those in the loan-to-value ratio= 0.5 
column of table 2). In the process, the variation in user costs for owner-
occupied housing would be halved from 4 to 2 percentage points, and the 
difference between the average costs of business capital and owner-occupied 
housing would decline from 3 to 1 percentage point. With imputed rental 
income at 6 per cent of value, the total variation of user costs across 
individuals would be reduced to 1 percentage point, and the difference between 
the average costs of business capital and owner-occupied housing would 
18with x = i/(l + 1t), the net user cost of owner-occupied housing simplifies to: 
p -d = a-1t + w, 
which is independent of the individual's marginal tax rate. 
19-rhe same result would be achieved if only real interest were taxed and deducted in the entire 
economy and estimated rental income were set equal to (i -1t)/(l + 1t) = 0.058 of house value. 
10 
decline to about 0.5 percentage point.20 
Table 3 Net user costs for owner occupied housing tax on imputed 
rental income and deductibility of mortgage interest 
Marginal 
tax rate 
0 
0.2125 
0.3925 
0.4725 
0.4825 
ote: 
Net user costs 
Fraction of house value taxed 
0.03 0.045 0.06 
0.0934 0.0934 0.0934 
0.0812 
0.0709 
0.0663 
0.0657 
0.0844 
0.0767 
0.0734 
0.0729 
0.0876 
0.0826 
0.0804 
0.0802 
a. Assumes 3% expected inflation and 9% nominal debt rates. 
For the efficiency gains to be substantial, the response to changed investment 
incentives must be significant. Regressions shown in Appendix A indicate 
price and income elasticities of -0.84 and 0.05, respectively.21 These price 
elasticities are roughly similar to Yates' estimates of -0.72 and 0.12.22 The 
large price elasticity suggests that efficiency gains should result from 
2°'fhe variation in user costs across taxable incomes could be completely eliminated if the 
fraction of house value subject to tax were graduated with the individual's marginal tax rate. 
Using the equation in footnote 10, and assuming property taxes, w, of 0.01, the fraction of 
house value, x, could be set equal to (0.07 - r1c)lt1c. The net user cost would be 8 per cent 
across all taxable incomes. 
21 We also note that income elasticity increases sharply with income, rising from only-0.08 for 
the bottom half of the income distribution to 0.30 for the top half, i.e., upper income groups 
with the greatest tax incentives to over-invest in housing are indeed spending proportionately 
more on housing. 
221. Yates, 'The Demand for Owner-Occupied Housing,' Australian Economic Papers 20 
(1981): 309-24. 
11 
introduction of a tax on net imputed rent. 
There is, of course, more than one way to improve the efficiency of 
capital allocation. In lieu of taxing imputed income from housing investment, 
more generous tax treatment of non-owner-occupied housing investments 
would also eliminate non-neutrality. Hendershott and Hu showed how business 
investment tax credits could be used in the United States to offset the tax-
favoured status of owner-occupied housing.23 Such an approach could be 
adopted as part of a shift toward greater reliance on consumption taxes. Such 
a shift is currently proposed by the Liberal and National Parties in Australia 
and has been advocated by some economists, although sharply criticised by 
others.24 Without mortgage interest deductibility, however, inefficienc~~s 
owing to the debt tax penalty would still exist. 
The Direct Distributional Impacts of Imputed Rent Taxation 
In her NHS paper, Apps' argues that a tax on imputed rent would be 
highly regressive and thus is inappropriate. Using data from the 1986 Income 
Distribution Survey, she calculates net imputed rents for owner-occupying 
households in Australia, assuming a 5 per cent gross rental yield. To calculate 
these rents she indexed the 1985-86 economic data, including incomes and 
house prices, to 1989-90 values using a subjective methodology, and then 
applied the 1989-90 marginal tax rate schedule. In the tables that follow, we 
also rely on data from the 1986 survey, but we do not index that data, and we 
apply 1985-86 tax rules. As is shown, the indexation and tax rule changes do 
23P.H. Hendershott and S.C. Hu, 'Government-Induced Biases in the Allocation of the Stock 
of Fixed Capital in the United States,' in G.M. von Furstenberg, ed., Capital, Efficiency and 
Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1980). 
24some of this debate may be found in J.G. Head, ed., Fightback! An Economic Assessment 
(Sydney: Australian Tax Research foundation, 1993). 
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not appear to matter, probably because the income tax rate changes generally 
were just an adjustment for tax bracket creep. 
Table 4 gives some details from the data set as well as our calculations of 
net imputed rents and additional taxes. This table may be compared with table 
1.2 in Apps (p. 17). Some notable aspects of the data are the relatively flat 
distribution of house prices across incomes, the increasing debt ratio with 
income, and the inverse relationship between age of the household head and 
household income. Although average income increases 14 times from the first 
to the tenth deciles, mean house price only doubles. The inverse relationship 
between age and income reflects the large proportion of pensioners in the 
lower income deciles. The rising debt ratio largely reflects the strong negative 
relation between debt usage and age, as shown in Appendix B, owing to the tax 
penalty on debt usage. 
We calculate net imputed rent assuming gross rent of 5 per cent of 
current house price, less 1 per cent of house price for property taxes, and 13 
per cent of the outstanding/ mortgage loan for interest (at the 1985-86 rate). 
We do not allow for deductibility of depreciation and maintenance (the user 
costs reported in tables 1 through 3 are all net of depreciation and 
maintenance). Our calculation of additional tax as a percentage of household 
income-not including net imputed rent is given in column 9. These 
percentages are quite similar to Apps' percentages, shown in column 10, in 
spite of her indexing of the data and application of a different tax schedule. 
Apps concludes from her results that the incidence of the tax on net imputed 
rent would be steeply regressive. According to either her results in column 11 
or ours in column 10, the ratio of additional taxes to income is about six times 
greater for the lowest decile households than for households in the upper half 
of the income distribution. 
These results are driven significantly by the differences in household age. 
Older households have far less debt than younger households and thus would 
Table 4 Mean household income, tax rates, house prices, mortgage debt, net imputed rent, additional 
taxes, and age of head, by decile of household income exclusive of net imputed rent, for all 
home-owning/(!urchasing households 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 
Household Household Revised House Loan Debt ratio Head's age Net imputed Additional Additional Apps' add'I 
Decile income($)" M1R (%)b M1R(%)° price($} ($} {%} (years} rent (S)d tax($)° tax(%)f tax (%lg 
4,782 18.6 20.9 69,229 3,537 5.0 63.3 2,309 497 10.4 11.3 
2 8,164 13.9 23.7 72,499 2,709 4.1 63.9 2,548 501 6.1 6.7 
3 11,078 21.4 24.6 80,134 3,860 5.5 60.3 2,704 655 6.0 5.1 
4 15,866 22.5 24.8 83,252 8,289 13.0 51.2 2,253 565 3.6 3.7 
5 20,859 27.3 28.8 83,277 12,365 19.0 45.4 1,724 536 2.6 2.7 
6 25,410 30.4 31.5 81,793 14,484 20.7 43.4 1,389 421 1.7 2.3 
7 29,861 31.6 32.7 88,522 15,270 21.1 42.7 1,556 520 1.7 1.9 
8 34,827 34.7 36.1 95 ,679 17,953 22.5 41.3 1,493 563 1.6 1.4 
9 42,393 40.0 41.1 102,783 19,120 22.0 42.I 1,626 698 1.6 1.6 
10 68,607 47.9 48.9 135 059 18,099 16.7 44.2 3,049 I 559 2.3 1.7 
All 26 163 28.8 31.3 89 203 II 566 15.0 49.8 2,065 651 2.5 2.4 
Source: 1986 Income Distribution Survey. 
Notes: 
a. Household income excluding net imputed rent. 
b . Household marginal tax rate excluding net imputed rent from income. This rate is calculated as the mean of spouses' rates if married 
couple. 
c. Household marginal tax rate if net imputed rent is included in income. 
d. Calculated as 5% of house price (column 4) less 1 % for property taxes and 13% (the assumed interest rate) of the outstanding mortgage 
loan (column 5). '-
e. Tax paid on net imputed rent assuming that the appropriate tax rate is the average of columns 2 and 3. 
f. Tax paid (column 9) as a percentage of household income excluding net imputed rent (column 1). ...... 
g. From P. Apps, The Role of Home Ownership, NHS Background Paper no. 10 (Canberra: AGPS), p. 17, table 1.2, column 6. Note that (.,.) 
columns 5 through 9 of Apps' table are mislabeled. 
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suffer, relatively, from the introduction of both a tax on imputed rental 
income and home mortgage interest deductibility. As can be seen from table 
4, the average age of the household head in the lowest three income quintiles is 
roughly 20 years greater than the average age of those in the top half of the 
income distribution, and the former's average debt ratio is only 0.05 versus 
about 0.20 for the latter. 
But Apps shows that her results hold, although much less strongly, when 
life cycle effects (age) are held roughly constant. When similar calculations 
are made for couple income units with the husband employed full-time and 
aged 25 to 54 (Apps' table 1.9), the average age of household heads varies only 
between 37 and 40 across income deciles and still the ratio of additional taxes 
to income drops from 0.018 for the first two deciles to about 0.013 for the 
next three, to roughly 0.010 for deciles 6 through 9, before rising to 0.014 for 
decile 10. Note, though, that the ratio of the additional tax burden of the 
lowest income decile to that of the top half of the income distribution has been 
lowered from six to less than two. 
Controlling for the life-cycle, as Apps has largely done with the analysis 
of 25 to 54 year olds, is appropriate when measuring equity effects of a policy 
change, as Yates emphasized in an earlier study of the distributional impact of 
imputed.rent taxation.25 Measuring income accurately is also important, and 
in this case that means including imputed rent in the income base.26 Income 
decile breaks for married couples ages 25 to 54 based on household income 
including estimates of imputed rent are shown in the first column of table 5. 
25J. Yates, 'An Analysis of the Distributional Impact of Imputed Rent Taxation,' Economic 
Record 58 (1982): 177-189. 
26Likc Apps in Australia, Ling and McGill fail to include imputed rent in the income base in 
their study of the distributional effects of hypothetical changes in U.S. tax law; sec D.C. Ling 
and G.A. McGill , 'Measuring the Size and Distributional Effects of Homcowncr Tax 
Preferences,' Journal of Housing Research 3 (1992): 273-303. 
Table 5 Mean household income, tax rates, house prices, mortgage debt, net imputed rent, 
additional taxes, and age of head, by decile of household income inclusive of net imputed rent, for all home-owning/purchasing married couples with heads ages 25 
to 54 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Household Household Revised House Loan Debt ratio Head's age Net imputed Additional Additional Decile income ($)1 MTR(%)b MTR(%l° P!!ce ($) ($) (%) (years) rent (S)d tax ($)e tax (%)f 
11 ,505 14.0 14.9 74 ,153 19,483 29.0 39.2 433 74 0.6 
2 19,839 20.6 20.5 76,242 17,902 27.4 38.7 722 135 0.7 
3 24,300 24.6 25.4 78,023 16,971 24.1 38.7 915 208 0.9 
4 27,831 27.1 27 .8 79,142 18,144 24.9 39.6 807 190 0.7 
5 31,246 29.1 30.1 91,526 18,901 24.1 39.5 1,204 322 1.0 
6 34,502 31.7 32.4 92,719 16,871 20.5 39.4 1,516 438 1.3 
7 38,300 34.0 35.3 94,561 16,956 21.0 39.3 1,578 497 1.3 
8 43 ,181 38.2 39.9 106,937 17,645 19.8 40.3 1,984 739 1.7 
9 50,605 42.9 44.1 111,062 18,168 18.8 39.5 2,081 885 1.7 
JO 79 421 49.0 50.3 158 525 16261 12.4 42 .5 4 227 2151 2.7 
All 36 073 31.1 32.1 96,289 17 730 22.2 39.7 I 547 564 1.6 
Source: 1986 Income Distribution Survey. 
Notes: 
a. Household income including net imputed rent. 
b-e. See table 4. 
f. Tax paid (column 9) as a percentage of household income including net imputed rent (column 1). 
..... 
Ul 
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The remaining columns present calculations similar to those in table 4, the last 
being the ratio of additional taxes paid to income. As can be seen, when the 
life cycle is held constant (note the relative constancy of the household head's 
age) and income is measured correctly, this ratio rises almost monotonically 
with income, i.e., the imputed rent tax is clearly progressive. (Note further 
that the ratio is almost perfectly negatively correlated with the debt ratio, as 
we would anticipate.) 
Table 6 reports comparable results for married couples ages 60 and 
older. Here the general pattern of the ratio of additional taxes paid to income 
is less clear, owing in part to the smaller sample size (996 versus 2,674 for 
married couples ages 25-54). Given that the ratio rises least for the two lowest 
income deciles, the tax could hardly be described as regressive. 
The above calculations ignore renters. Because renters pay no additional 
tax and are more heavily represented in lower income deciles, tables 5 and 6 
understate the progressivity of an imputed rent tax. Table 7 reports results 
when samples of 737 married couple renters between ages 25 to 54 
(representing 22 per cent of married couples ages 25 to 54) and 143 couple 
renters ages 60 and older (representing 13 per cent of married couples ages 60 
and older) are merged with the home-owning/purchasing samples, and the 
, 
income deciles (including net imputed rents of owners/purchasers) are 
redefined. Because renting married couples are a small fraction of all married 
couples, the results do not change markedly, except for the lowest income 
decile, who are now seen to pay negligible additional taxes. The percentage 
increase in taxes for the lowest income decile would be only about one-sixth 
the increase for the top half of the income distribution, rather than the six 
times increase Apps reports in her table 1.2. 
Table 6 Mean household income, tax rates, house prices, mortgage debt, net imputed rent, 
additional taxes, and age of head, by decile of household income inclusive of net imputed rent, for all home-owning/purchasing married couples with heads ages 60 
and older 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Household Household Revised House Loan Debt ratio Head's age Net imputed Additional Additional Decile income($)" MTR(%)b MTR(%)C price($) ($) (%) (yt.ats} rent($)'1 tax($}" tax (%)f 
9,3!6 3.5 17.7 59,321 2,391 3.6 69.3 2,062 196 2.1 
2 11 ,119 7.0 24.0 60,924 2,017 1.6 69.5 2,175 323 2.9 
3 11,911 13.4 24.8 61 ,m 374 0.5 69.5 2,422 447 3.8 
4 12,843 17.7 24.6 68,921 492 0.7 69.7 2,693 544 4.2 
5 13,958 19.5 24.9 81,895 484 0.5 69.6 3,213 687 4.9 
6 15,624 20.6 24.3 93,420 964 2.1 67.4 3,611 803 5.1 
7 18,409 19.6 22.4 87,067 304 0.5 67.1 3,443 739 4.0 
8 23,134 22.0 25.2 95,170 1,911 2.9 66.2 3,558 831 3.6 
9 31,843 28.6 31.6 105,788 955 I.I 65.7 4,107 1,224 3.8 
10 62967 41.7 44.8 150 387 I 818 1.5 65.2 5 779 2 575 4.1 
All 21112 19.4 26.4 86467 1171 1.5 67.9 3 306 837 4.0 
Source: 1986 Income Distribution Survey. 
Notes: See table 5. 
18 
Table 7 Mean household income, additional taxes, and incremental 
tax rates by decile of household income inclusive of net 
imputed rent for all married couples with heads ages 25 to 
54 and 60 and older, res~ectivel,r 
Ag~ 2~ lQ~4 6 i,:s;s !iQ 11!.1d !21d1<1: 
Household Additional Additional Household Additional Additional 
Decile income tax ($l tax (%l income tax ($l tax (%l 
1 9,879 32 0.3 7,976 43 0.5 
2 17,818 85 0.5 10,605 233 2.2 
3 22,486 151 0.7 11 ,480 372 3.2 
4 26,277 159 0.6 12,451 495 4.0 
5 29,799 232 0.8 13,574 589 4.3 
6 33,286 268 0.8 15,121 730 4.8 
7 37,078 427 1.2 17,822 707 4.0 
8 41,527 522 1.3 22,431 741 3.3 
9 48,633 702 1.4 31,083 1,055 3.4 
10 76,181 1,817 2.4 60,522 2,352 3.9 
Conclusion 
All policy changes create winners and losers, and economists have 
sufficient difficulty inducing politicians to adopt efficiency-improving policies 
without the over-statement of the losers' losses. The difficulty is compounded 
if lower income households are mistakenly identified as the losers. Moreover, 
even if an efficiency-improving tax is regressive, arguing against it on these 
grounds is not in the best tradition of economics. Rather, one should look for 
ways to use the added tax revenues to reduce the regressivity of the tax 
increase in order to facilitate generating the efficiency gains. 
Fortunately, we are able to show that when the life cycle is controlled for 
and income is measured appropriately, the direct distributional impact of a tax 
on imputed rental income is progressive, not regressive. This would seem to 
argue for returning the tax revenues raised disproportionately to higher 
income households, unless one wishes to increase the progressivity of the tax 
system. 
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An imputed rental tax with mortgage interest deductibility would induce 
many behavioural responses. For example, the demand for owner-occupied 
housing of younger households would rise, while that of older households 
woµld fall. The most striking behavioural response would likely be a sharp 
increase in mortgage debt, possibly raising the aggregate loan-to-value ratio 
from 0.15 to above 0.4 as in the U.S. This increase would reduce the revenue 
raised from the tax to the extent that the debt is used to fund consumption or 
investment in partially taxed assets. That is, there will be less revenue to 
redistribute than the average ratios of additional taxes paid to income listed in 
tables 4 to 6 suggest. 
An appropriate use of such revenue would be to phase in the tax for older 
owner/purchaser households. As we have noted, these households have little 
debt and thus would lose relative to younger owner/purchaser households with 
much debt. While this effect washes out for yet unformed owner/purchaser 
households, who would presumably be both young and old at different stages, 
currently older owner/purchaser households would not have had the benefit of 
mortgage interest deductions when they were young and thus should not be 
taxed disproportionately heavily now.27 An appropriate rule whereby 
currently older owner/purchasers would pay tax on only a fraction of imputed 
rental income could easily be devised. 
27Tuey may, of course, have had the benefit of various first-time home owner subsidies. 
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Appendix A: Income and Price Elasticity Estimates 
We regress the log of the quantity of housing demanded, Qk, on the log of 
household income, Yk, and the log of the real price of housing, Pk. The 
quantity of housing demanded, Qt, is defined as V kf(Pj/P ), where: 
V k = the value of the house occupied by household k; 
Pj = the price of a constant-quality three-bedroom house in the capital 
city, j, of the state of residence (details of the derivation of these 
prices are available from the authors); and 
P = the weighted average price of a constant-quality three-bedroom house 
across all capital cities (except Darwin). 
The real price of housing is a function of the relative price of a constant-
quality house in the capital city of the state of residence and the household's 
user cost of owner occupied housing: 
where: 
Pk = the real price of housing faced by household k; 
vf = the household's current mortgage loan-to-value ratio; 
i =the risk-free interest rate (= 0.13); 
im =the mortgage interest rate (= 0.13; this value did not exceed the risk-
free rate owing to the effective subsidy resulting from interest rate 
regulation); 
tk = the household's average marginal tax rate (calculated as the average 
rate of the household head and spouse if a couple or simply the 
head's rate otherwise); 
d =depreciation and maintenance(= 0.035); 
Wk = property taxes paid by the household as a fraction of house value; 
a = a risk premium (= 0.03); and 
1t =expected inflation(= 0.07). 
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The data set did not allow us to separate out capital city residents from others . 
. Using a sample of 2,674 married couples with heads aged between 25 and 
54 we obtained (with standard errors in parentheses): 
ln Qk = 8.93 + 0.047 ln Yk - 0.843 ln Pk (0.14) (0.014) (0.028) 
2 (R = 0.29). 
For the bottom 50 per cent of incomes in this sample (below $31,544): 
ln Qk = 10.02 - 0.078 ln Yk - 0.902 ln Pk 2 (R = 0.25). 
For the top 50 per cent: 
ln Qk = 6.52 + 0.303 ln Yk - 0.716 ln Pk (0.38) (0.038) (0.036) 
2 (R = 0.32). 
The results from a large sample of 5,391 households of all ages and 
marital statuses were: 
ln Qk = 8.55 + 0.115 ln Yk - 0.695 ln Pk (0.08) (0.008) (0.020) 
2 (R = 0.26). 
For the bottom 50 per cent of incomes (below $23,157): 
ln Qk = 9.31 + 0.050 ln Yk - 0.617 ln Pk (0.14) (0.014) (0.030) 
2 (R = 0.14). 
For the top 50 per cent of incomes: 
ln Qk = 6.89 + 0.267 ln Yk - 0.717 1n Pk (0.23) (0.023) (0.026) 
2 (R = 0.30). 
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Appendix B: Effects of Income and Age on Mortgage Debt Ratio 
Following Yates' suggestion, we use age of the household head as a proxy 
for life cycle effects. We regressed the loan-to-value ratio, v, on the log of 
household income, Y, and dummy variables, AGE1-J, for all of the home-
owning households in the age groups defined in the 1986 Income Distribution 
Survey, with the exception of those groups ages 60 and older (previous 
estimations showed that the coefficients for 60-plus age groups were not 
significantly different from zero). The results were (with standard errors in 
parentheses): 
v = -0.053 + 0.0070 In Y + 0.639 AGE18 20 + 0.489 AGE21 24 + 0.432AGE25 29 (0.032) (0.0035) (0.092) - (0.021) - (0.011) -
+ 0.332AGE30 34 + 0.222AGE35 39 + 0.136AGE40 44 + 0.104AGE45 49 (0.009) - (0.009) - (0.009) - (0.010) -
+ (i:8W)AGE50-54 + £:&tJ/GE55-59 
(R2 = 0.40) 
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